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ABSTRACT: For the development of computation tools to support the pragma-dialectical analysis of 
argumentative texts, a formal approximation of the pragma-dialectical ideal model of a critical discussion 
theory is required. A basic dialogue game for critical discussion is developed as the foundation for such 
formal approximation. To this basic dialogue game, which has a restricted complexity, the more complex 
features of critical discussion can gradually be added.  
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1. FORMALISATION IN PREPARATION OF COMPUTERISATION 
 
Formalisation is one of the important developments in the field of argumentation theory 
emphasised by van Eemeren in his keynote address at the 8
th
 ISSA conference. My 
contribution to the ISSA conference deals with the formalisation of one theory of 
argumentation: the pragma-dialectical theory (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004; van 
Eemeren et al., 2014, pp. 517-613). This study is intended to contribute to a more 
encompassing research project, the overall goal of which is to create a formal foundation 
for a computational application of the pragma-dialectical theory.  
 The computational application of argumentation theory in general has developed 
into several directions, as is evident from, e.g., the overviews by Rahwan and Simari  
(2009) and van Eemeren et al. (2014, pp. 615-675). Instead of trying to formalise and 
computerise every possible application of the pragma-dialectical theory at once, the 
current aim is to create a foundation for computational tools to support the analysis of 
argumentative discourse. Although fully computerised pragma-dialectical analysis will 
presumably not be feasible for quite some time, smaller digital tools to assist human 
analysts in their analytical tasks can be realised on a shorter term. 
 One area in which such a smaller tool can offer support is the composition of the 
analytic overview. As the outcome of a (standard) pragma-dialectical analysis of an 
argumentative text, the analytic overview “brings together systematically everything that 
is relevant to the resolution of a difference of opinion” (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 
2004, p. 118).
1
 In order to arrive at an analytic overview, the analyst applies a two-step 
                                                        
1
 In the extended pragma-dialectical theory (van Eemeren, 2010), the rhetorical dimension of a text is also 
analysed, which would lead to a more elaborate result of the analysis. At the moment I will not take such 
analysis of strategic manoeuvring and activity type into account.  
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method. First, the ideal model of a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, 
pp. 42-68) is used as a heuristic to determine which parts of the original text are (or can be 
considered as) argumentatively relevant. By applying four analytical transformation, the 
original text is reconstructed in terms of a critical discussion (van Eemeren et al., 1993, pp. 
61-62). In the second step, an analytic overview is abstracted from this reconstruction. The 
composition of the analytic overview is fully determined by the content of the 
reconstruction in terms of a critical discussion. Based on the discussion moves made by 
discussants in the analytical reconstruction, the following is determined as part of the 
analytic overview: the nature of the difference of opinion, the distribution of discussion 
roles, the starting points, the arguments, the structure of the argumentation and the 
argument schemes (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 118-119). 
 To develop a computational tool to support analysts in composing an analytic 
overview on the basis of a reconstruction of the original text in terms of a critical 
discussion, it is necessary to have a computational representation of the relations between 
the possible variations in the constitutive parts of the ideal model and those of the analytic 
overview. Preliminary to these relations, computational representations of the ideal model 
of a critical discussion, and of the analytic overview themselves are necessary. In the 
current paper a preparatory step towards the computational representation of the ideal 
model of a critical discussion is made by formalising part of the ideal model. 
 
2. A FORMAL APPROXIMATION OF CRITICAL DISCUSSION 
 
The formal perspective on the pragma-dialectical ideal model is developed as a dialogue 
game. This dialogue game can be considered a formal approximation of the ideal model of 
a critical discussion. As an ‘approximation’, the dialogue game is not intended to replace 
the original model in any way – a conclusion that might inadvertently be drawn if it would 
be called a 'formalisation' proper. Additionally, the term 'approximation' indicates that it is 
unlikely that all features of the original ideal model can be preserved entirely in the formal 
dialogue game.  
 When a discrepancy between the original model and its formal counterpart occurs, 
this may in some cases indicate a flaw or imprecision in the original. In other cases it can 
be the result of the streamlining that is required to conform to the expressiveness of the 
formalism used. More often than not, a formalism is less expressive than a model 
expressed in natural language. One reason why this is so, is the requirement in formal 
models to explicitly and unambiguously define what is included, while excluding 
everything else. In this respect the formal approximation is stricter than the original ideal 
model. 
 The notion of a ‘formal approximation’ is analogous to that of an ‘empirical 
approximation’ of critical discussion introduced by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2005). 
Empirical approximations are used in the extended pragma-dialectical theory (van 
Eemeren, 2010), where the focus is shifted from the idealised case of a critical discussion 
in the standard theory to studying the intricacies of argumentative discourse in everyday 
use. Unsurprisingly, interlocutors in ordinary discourse turn out not to behave exactly in 
accordance with an ideal model of communication. This does however not mean that they 
abandon all ideals entirely. For argumentative discourse, the ideal of reasonableness is a 
case in point. 
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To study the actual practice of argumentative discourse, the pragma-dialectical ideal 
model can be used as an analytic heuristic to make sense of the conventionalised 
communicative activities by seeing how they diverge from the ideal model. In this view, 
the ideal model is realised in terms of its empirical counterparts in ordinary 
communication. An actual argumentative exchange is then said to be an empirical 
approximation of the ideal model of a critical discussion.  
 Although it should be clear that an ideal model does not actually occur in 
communicative reality
2
 ‒ which is why actual argumentative discourse can merely be 
regarded empirical approximations ‒ it may not be so clear why an ideal model could not 
be formal. Indeed, Krabbe and others (Krabbe & Walton, 2011, p. 246; Krabbe, 2012, p. 
12; van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 304) have observed that the pragma-dialectical ideal 
model can already be said to be formal in the sense of being procedurally regimented 
(formal3 in Barth and Krabbe’s taxonomy (1982, pp. 14-19; Krabbe, 1982)) and a priori or 
normative (formal4). The formal approximation of critical discussion developed as a 
dialogue game, is intended to also be formal in the sense of rigorously specifying the 
linguistically well-formed expressions and the way in which these can be combined and 
used in a discussion (formal2).  
 
3. RESTRICTING THE COMPLEXITY OF THE MODEL 
 
The formal approximation of critical discussion is not developed all at once. Instead, a 
basic dialogue game is developed to which more complex features of the original ideal 
model can be gradually introduced. This systematic approach has the practical advantage 
of decomposing a larger task, so that the smaller components can be developed at different 
times or by different people. A second, theoretic advantage is that the gradual introduction 
of complex features provide insight into the model itself because its features can be 
studied in isolation, without other aspects complicating matters. 
 The basic dialogue game is developed to fulfil the role of the simplified basis to 
which more complexity can later be added. To lower the complexity of the dialogue game, 
three restrictions are in place with respect to the original ideal model, which the dialogue 
game is a formal approximation of. First, only the dialectical dimension of critical 
discussion is taken into account, disregarding the realisation of discussion moves in the 
ideal model through speech acts (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984) and the rhetorical 
dimension of strategic manoeuvring (van Eemeren, 2010). Second, the dialogue game 
offers players fewer choices and opportunities compared to the original model. This 
restriction is most evident in the exclusion of complex argumentation, only allowing an 
arguer to put forward one single argument for his standpoint. Third, only the 
argumentation stage of critical discussion is explicitly part of the dialogue game, while of 
the other three discussion stages a specific (uncomplicating) outcome is assumed. 
For the confrontation stage, the assumption is that a single positive standpoint was put 
forward, which met with doubt. This restricts the dialogue game to single non-mixed 
differences of opinion about a single positive standpoint, excluding differences of opinion 
                                                        
2
 There has nevertheless been confusion about the possible occurrence of critical discussion (introduced as a 
theoretical ideal model) in communicative reality, see e.g. the remarks by Garssen (2009). 
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about multiple standpoints or where a negative or opposing standpoint is assumed. The 
main restriction resulting from the assumed outcome of the opening stage is that only a 
single argument may be put forward, which may only be challenged by doubt, not by 
contradiction. Since the concluding stage only comes after the argumentation stage, no 
assumptions have to be made about that stage.
3
 The overall result of the assumed 
outcomes of the confrontation and opening stages is that the basic dialogue game 
developed in the next section is a formal approximation of the dialectical dimension of the 
argumentation stage of non-complex, consistently non-mixed critical discussions about 
one positive standpoint which is defended by appealing to a single justificatory reason.  
 
4. A BASIC DIALOGUE GAME FOR CRITICAL DISCUSSION 
 
The dialogue game is introduced by means of five categories of rules. First, there are rules 
that determine the initial state of the game. Second, the moves that are available to the 
players are defined. Third, the effect of making moves on players' commitments is made 
clear. Fourth, the sequential rules determine in which order moves may be made, 
sanctioning the structure of the dialogue. Fifth, there are rules specifying how the game 
ends; both when and in whose favour. The rules of the dialogue game are based on the 15 
'technical' rules of critical discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 135-157). 
These rules should not be confused with the 'practical' code of conduct consisting of 10 
commandments for reasonable discussants (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 208-
209), which are based on the aforementioned 15 rules and are intended to be used as a rule 
of thumb in evaluating and conducting actual argumentative discussions. Due to the 
restrictions introduced in the preceding section, of the 15 rules, in particular rules 6-13 are 
relevant for the basic dialogue game.
4
 
 In line with the ideal model, the basic dialogue game for critical discussion is 
played by two (teams of) players. The constitution of the players is left undetermined. In 
the ideal model the assumption is that the discussion parties are human interlocutors, but 
because the development of the dialogue game for critical discussion is intended to form a 
basis for pragma-dialectically oriented work in artificial settings, the nature of players of 
the game is left undefined. Eventually the dialogue game should be such that both human 
and artificial agents can play it.  
 How players internally represent the current and past states of the dialogue during 
the game and how they keep track of their own and the other player's commitments is not a 
concern for the rules of the dialogue game. In the case of human players the internal make-
up is a matter for cognitive psychology (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984, p. 6), in the 
case of artificial agents, for software engineering. For the basic dialogue game it is 
sufficient to assume there to be some way of modelling the players. The rules of the 
                                                        
3
 The outcome of the concluding stage does become important when complex argumentation is taken into 
account, but in the basic dialogue game only single argumentation can occur. In the case of single 
argumentation, the outcome of the concluding stage is not directly relevant for what happens in the 
argumentation stage (obviously this does not hold the other way around). 
4
 Exactly how the rules of the dialogue game relate to the 15 rules of the ideal model cannot be covered in 
this paper, for this I refer to my dissertation. 
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dialogue game will not refer to, nor take into account, the individual modelling or private 
belief sets of the players. 
 A further aspect of the make-up of players which is not addressed in the rules for 
the dialogue game, is the matter of strategy. While playing the dialogue game, players 
have choices to make about their subsequent moves. Players can employ different 
strategies in playing the game to increase their chances of winning. Similar to the internal 
constitution of the players, their strategies are left undefined in the dialogue game rules. 
Rather, these strategies are taken to be part of the ('subjective' or 'internal') make-up (i.e. 
artificial modelling or psychological constitution) of the players. 
 The dialogue game rules assume there to be a formal language ℒ in which the 
propositions the game is about can be expressed. The nature of ℒ is not the object of the 
current study. It is therefore at present sufficient to take ℒ to consist of the sentences of 
propositional logic closed under the usual classical operators. All occurrences of φ or ψ in 
the rules refer to (atomic or molecular) propositions of ℒ.  
 A second (formal) system is required to represent the inferences appealed to by 
players in the dialogue game. Because the basic dialogue game is only intended as a 
simplified foundation, no assumptions are made about the particular reasoning system 
underpinning the inferences used in the game. The only requirement is that there is some 
external method of deciding the soundness of inferences. Although more elaborate 
systems (for example the pragma-dialectical account of argument schemes with critical 
questions (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Garssen, 1997), or non-monotonic systems 
of defeasible reasoning (e.g., Pollock, 1987; Dung, 1995) can be introduced as part of the 
gradual addition of complexity to the dialogue game, for the moment classical 
propositional logic can be taken to provide the inference rules applied by players in the 
dialogue game. Any reference to φ⇒ψ can then be interpreted as an appeal to a rule of 
inference from propositional logic on the basis of which the acceptability of φ justifies the 
acceptability of ψ. 
 
4.1 Commencement rules 
 
The commencement rules determine the initial state of the game before the first move has 
been made. Because both the confrontation and the opening stages of critical discussion 
are not explicitly modelled, the assumed outcomes of these stages are reflected in the 
initial state. With respect to the confrontation stage, the result is that the basic dialogue 
game for critical discussion is played by two players to determine the tenability of a 
positive standpoint with respect to some proposition ψ∈ℒ. 
 Based on the assumed outcome of the opening stage, the two players are 
designated Prot and Ant, corresponding to the discussion roles of protagonist and 
antagonist in (the argumentation stage of) a critical discussion. Prot is defending a positive 
standpoint with respect to ψ, while Ant critically assesses the defence, having doubt 
regarding the acceptability of ψ. Another outcome of the opening stage is the agreement 
upon a set of material and procedural starting points. In the dialogue game the material 
starting points are represented by a static set SP (for Starting Points) of propositions both 
players accept. Because the players need at least one common starting point to engage in a 
fruitful discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 139), SP is assumed to be non-
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empty: SP ≠ ∅.5 The procedural starting points are reflected in the following three 
assumptions: the players agree to play by the rules of the game; the players conform to a 
turn-based approach, where a player makes one of the moves defined in the next 
subsection after which the turn passes to the other player; the players have agreed upon an 
inferential system and a way to check the acceptability of instantiated inferences. 
 Finally, the purpose of the dialogue game is for the players to resolve their 
difference of opinion about ψ, where Prot will defend a positive standpoint with respect to 
ψ by providing argumentation supporting ψ and Ant critically tests ψ's tenability by 
challenging the argumentation. 
 
4.2 Move rules 
 
Each turn one of the players makes one move. The moves made are of the form type(φ). 
The function the move fulfils in the context of the dialogue game is designated by type. 
The propositional content of the move is made up by either an (atomic or molecular) 
proposition φ∈ℒ, or the application of an inference rule (⇒) on a pair of propositions φ,ψ∈
ℒ. Each unique instantiation of a move, i.e. the combination of a type and propositional 
content, can only be used as a move by a player once per game – in other words, a player 
may not repeat the exact same move he has already made before. 
 The basic dialogue game for critical discussion is asymmetrical with respect to the 
role the two players fulfil. Because of this, there are two separate sets of moves which are 
available to the two players of the game depending on their role. To defend his standpoint 
about ψ, Prot has the following moves available to him: 
 
(M1) argue(φ): to present φ as an argument for ψ. (Note that φ≠ψ, to prevent 
circular reasoning). 
(M2) identify(φ): to initiate the intersubjective identification procedure, in order to 
check the mutual acceptability of φ, here taken to be decidable by checking 
whether φ∈SP. 
(M3) test(φ⇒ψ): to initiate the intersubjective testing procedure, in order to test the 
acceptability of the justificatory force of φ for ψ, assumed to be decidable through 
some external method, by determining whether φ⇒ψ is a sound instantiation of an 
inference rule. 
(M4) retract(φ): to retract commitment to an argument, where φ∈CSProt. 
(M5) conclusive_defence(ψ): to claim victory after a successful defence of a 
positive standpoint with respect to ψ.  
 
 
                                                        
5
 In the current dialogue game the set of common starting points SP is static: it is determined at the 
beginning of the game, and even if the common ground (understood as the commitments shared by both 
players) changes by some player acquiring or retracting a commitment, the set of common starting points is 
not increased or reduced. This obviously is something that is important to think about and possibly change in 
more complex dialogue games. For the current basic dialogue game, whether SP is static is irrelevant, 
because SP is referenced once at most during the course of a game: as part of the intersubjective 
identification procedure, which can only occur before any accept(.) or retract(.) moves can be made. 
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To critically test Prot's argumentation, Ant can make use of the following moves: 
 
(M6) accept(φ): to accept φ in defence of ψ. 
(M7) challenge(φ): to cast doubt on the material premise φ of an earlier move 
argue(φ). 
(M8) challenge(φ⇒ψ): to cast doubt on the justificatory force φ⇒ψ of an earlier 
move argue(φ). 
(M9) successful_attack(φ): to claim the successful challenging of the acceptability 
of φ. 
(M10) successful_attack(φ⇒ψ): to claim the successful challenging of the 
acceptability of φ⇒ψ. 
(M11) conclusive_attack(ψ): to claim victory after a successful criticism of Prot's 
argumentative defence of ψ. 
 
4.3 Commitment  rules 
 
As a result of making moves, players acquire (and retract) commitments. These 
commitments are called 'dialectical', referring to their dialectical function in a discussion, 
and are conceived of in line with Hamblin’s (1970) conception. If a player is committed to 
a certain proposition, this means he should be prepared (or is even obliged) to defend the 
acceptability of the proposition if prompted to do so, in other words he assumes a potential 
burden of proof.
6
 
 Both players are associated with an individual commitment store in which the 
propositions a player is committed to in the dialogue are kept track of. A player’s 
commitment store is represented by a set of propositions, which is publicly readable 
(meaning that it is available for all players) and privately writeable (meaning that a player 
can only directly update his own commitment store, not that of the other player). At the 
start of the game, the players' commitment stores are filled with some propositions. Based 
on the requirements at the start of the game, Prot's commitment store contains the 
common starting points and the standpoint ψ,7 while Ant's commitment store only contains 
the common starting points. It is important to note that the respective commitment stores 
may contain additional propositions than those mentioned here, so long as ψ∉CSAnt – 
otherwise Ant would also be committed to the standpoint before starting the game, so that 
no difference of opinion would arise in the first place. Before any moves are made, the 
players' commitment stores are as follows:  
 
 (C1) CSProt = SP ∪ {ψ}. 
 (C2) CSAnt = SP. 
                                                        
6
 In my dissertation I give a more elaborate account of what kind of commitments are considered in the 
dialogue game for critical discussion. This is especially relevant once the pragmatic dimension of the ideal 
model is taken into account: the felicity conditions of the speech acts used to make discussion moves, will 
then be modelled in terms of 'dialogical' commitments. 
7
 Technically ψ is the propositional content of the standpoint Ant doubted, cf. the discussions about 
standpoints and propositions by, e.g., van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, pp. 78-79) and Houtlosser 
(1995, pp. 65-91). 
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As a result of moves during the game, these commitment stores can be updated. The 
performance of some moves results in the acquisition of new commitments, while other 
moves retract commitments. There are three moves in the basic dialogue game for critical 
disussion that result in an update of the player's commitment store (with the affected 
commitment store before the equals sign, and the resulting updated commitment store after 
it): 
 
(C3) argue(φ): CSProt = CSProt ∪ {φ, φ⇒ψ}. 
(C4) retract(φ): CSProt = CSProt ‒ {φ, φ⇒ψ}. 
(C5) accept(φ): CSAnt = CSAnt ∪ {φ, φ⇒ψ}. 
 
4.4 Sequential rules 
 
The preceding two subsections presented respectively which moves there are in the basic 
dialogue game for critical discussion and what the effect is of making these moves in 
terms of the players’ commitments. The sequential rules introduced in this subsection 
define when moves can be made. The dialogue game is always started by Prot making a 
move argue(φ) to put forward φ in defence of the standpoint at issue, ψ. At which 
moments the other moves can legally be made is dependent on the state of the game at that 
moment. The relevant aspects of the state of the game in this respect are the move made 
by the other player in the preceding turn, and in some cases the content of the commitment 
stores of the players. This results in the following rules: 
 
(S1) argue(φ): starting move, if ψ is argued for, then φ≠ψ. 
(S2) identify(φ): may follow challenge(φ), where φ represents an argument's 
propositional content. 
(S3) test(φ⇒ψ): may follow challenge(φ⇒ψ), where φ⇒ψ represents an argument's 
justificatory force. 
(S4) retract(φ): may follow challenge(φ), challenge(φ⇒ψ), successful_attack(φ), 
or successful_attack(φ⇒ψ).8 
(S5) conclusive_defence(ψ): follows accept(φ). 
(S6) accept(φ): may follow identify(φ) if φ∈SP, test(φ⇒ψ) if φ⇒ψ is sound, or 
argue(φ). 
(S7) challenge(φ): may follow argue(φ), or test(φ⇒ψ) if φ⇒ψ is sound. 
(S8) challenge(φ⇒ψ): may follow argue(φ), or identify(φ) if φ∈SP. 
(S9) successful_attack(φ): follows identify(φ) if φ∉SP. 
(S10) successful_attack(φ⇒ψ): follows test(φ⇒ψ) if φ⇒ψ is not sound. 
(S11) conclusive_attack(ψ): follows retract(φ). 
 
 
                                                        
8
 Note that this means that failure in intersubjective procedures cannot be rectified by Prot in the current 
dialogue game. This would require further argumentation, resulting in complex discussions, the 
consequences of which I have explored before (Visser, 2013). 
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Prot: argue(φ) 
Ant: challenge(φ⇒ψ)Ant: challenge(φ)
Prot: test(φ⇒ψ)
Ant: successfull_attack(φ⇒ψ)
Prot: identify(φ)
Ant: successfull_attack(φ)
Prot: retract(φ)
Ant: conclusive_attack(ψ)
Ant: accept(φ)
Prot: conclusive_defence(ψ)
 
 
 Figure 1: The sequential structure of the basic dialogue game. 
 
To clarify the sequential structure of the basic dialogue game, I present Figure 1 as a 
visualisation of the sanctioned sequences in terms of a tree. The nodes of the tree are the 
moves of the dialogue game (with the format [Player: type(propositional content)] and the 
arrows indicate the possible transitions between moves (from one turn to the next).
9
 The 
node at the top of Figure 1 denotes the start of the game, i.e. the first move. The dialogue 
game terminates at one of the two nodes at the bottom of Figure 1. The route straight 
through the middle of the tree is the shortest route where Ant immediately accepts the 
                                                        
9
 This visualisation is very similar to the dialectical profiles of the argumentation stage of a critical 
discussion developed by van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007), and the elaboration 
thereof by Lewiński (2010, p. 121). One important difference between the dialectical profile and this 
visualisation of the dialogue game becomes clear once complex argumentation is incorporated into the 
dialogue game. An example is the ‘profile’ visualisation of the dialogue game presented by Visser et al. 
(2011), which takes the form of a graph, incorporating cyclic routes to capture the recursive composition of 
complex discussions. 
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argument. In the left and right routes, the acceptability of, respectively, the propositional 
content and the justificatory force of the argument are challenged. 
 
4.5 Termination rules 
 
The concluding stage is not explicitly incorporated in the basic dialogue game for critical 
discussion. It is nevertheless clear that the winning or losing of the dialogue game can be 
based on the outcome discussants can obtain in the argumentation stage of the ideal model. 
The dialogue game terminates if one of the players performs the move 
conclusive_attack(ψ) or conclusive_defence(ψ). Once the game has stopped in this way, 
the winner is Prot if φ∈CSAnt, (corresponding to the case where the antagonist accepts φ as 
an argument in defence of ψ) and Ant otherwise.10 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
I began this paper by discussing the role the basic dialogue game for critical discussion 
plays in a more encompassing research project. The aim of this project is to lay a formal 
foundation for the development of digital tools to aid the pragma-dialectical analysis of 
argumentative discourse. To constrain the scope of the project, the current focus is on 
tools to computerise the abstraction of an analytic overview from a reconstruction of a text 
in terms of a critical discussion. In preparation of the development of such an analytical 
tool, a formal approximation of the ideal model of a critical discussion is necessary, 
together with the relation between this formal approximation and the elements of an 
analytic overview. 
 The formal approximation is started in this paper with a basic dialogue game for 
critical discussion. The game is defined in terms of rules for commencement, moves, 
commitments, sequences and termination. By following the rules of the basic dialogue 
game, two players can play a game by entering in a simple dialogue. One of the players 
presents an argument in defence of a standpoint that has not been mutually accepted. The 
other player can respond by challenging the propositional content or justificatory force of 
the argumentation, or by accepting it. A challenge can be parried by initiating the relevant 
intersubjective procedure to check the acceptability, or can be followed by a retraction of 
the argumentation. Depending on the outcomes of the intersubjective procedures and the 
acceptance or retraction of the argumentation, one of the two players wins the game. 
Even though it is obvious from this simple characterisation that there is not much inherent 
value in the basic dialogue game as a playable game, it does however serve a purpose as a 
foundation for future work. This goal required the dialogue game to be relatively easy to 
develop and understand, so that formal approximations of more complex features of the 
ideal model can be modelled on the basis of this simplified dialogue game, and their effect 
be investigated systematically and in isolation. 
 
                                                        
10
 Note that neither will ψ be added to the Ant's commitments yet, nor that commitment to ψ will be retracted 
by Prot yet. Drawing such conclusions with respect to the acceptability of the standpoint on the basis of the 
argumentation stage is what happens in the concluding stage. 
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